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 QUID PRO QUO: 
PIERCING THE REPORTER’S  PRIVILEGE  FOR  
MEDIA WHO RIDE ALONG 
 Dina Hovsepian*  
 
The  reporter’s  privilege,  also  known  as  the  reporter’s  shield  law,  ex-
ists to protect reporters from forced disclosure regarding confidential in-
formation and sources.  Stemming from the First Amendment right to free-
dom of press, this privilege seeks to safeguard the free flow of information.  
However, reporters are frequently participating in media ride-alongs during 
which they are permitted to accompany police officers in their daily duties.  
As a result of these ride-alongs, reporters witness arrests, search warrant 
executions, and crime scene investigations.  When subsequently subpoe-
naed to testify during the criminal trial related to those events, these report-
ers assert their privilege and refuse to testify.  Often times, courts uphold 
their privilege.  However, doing so infringes on the criminal defendant’s  
Sixth  Amendment  right  to  a  fair  trial.    An  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privi-
lege should be implemented when a reporter participates in a media ride-
along since testifying to their eyewitness accounts would not violate the 
purpose of the privilege.  Mandating that the reporters testify would not 
disrupt the free flow of information, nor would it require disclosure of con-
fidential information.  Instead, such an exception would only require re-
porters to testify to information witnessed as the result of the police-
permitted ride-along.  Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial 
trumps the First Amendment right to freedom of press in this context, fur-
ther supporting an exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege.     
 
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 
2009.  The author would like to dedicate this Comment to her eldest brother, Patrick, for defining 
true strength and determination.  She would also like to thank her family (her father Razmik, 
mother Hilda, and brother Nicholas) for their continued support and guidance through her en-
deavors.  She would not be the person she is today without their love, humor, and inspiration.  A 
special thank you to Laurie Levenson for her academic assistance and responsiveness to the end-
less e-mails and to Mark Geragos for his valuable insight.  The author thanks Teo for his endless 
encouragement and motivating words, and Tina and Linette for lending their ears throughout the 
drafting and editing process.  And not to be forgotten, her greatest gratitude to the talented and 
hardworking staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their dedication 
and meticulous work in the production of this Comment. 
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 “Over  the  last  several  decades,  the  media’s  role  has  morphed  from  that  of  
watchdog against police abuse to cheerleader for the prosecution.  The 
protections afforded the reporter to shield them as against a Defendant’s  
right to a fair trial have become quaint in our modern 24/7 media age.  Re-
porters who embed themselves with the police must realize that the price 
for such access comes at the expense of the First Amendment not the Sixth 
Amendment  guarantee  of  a  defendant’s  right  to  fair  trial.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  The Crime Scene, the Police, and the Reporter 
Imagine it is 11:37 PM on a Tuesday night when a swarm of Los An-
geles Police Department officers arrive at an underground brothel where a 
murder has taken place.  Riding along with the police is a reporter from the 
Los Angeles Times.  At the scene, the reporter documents evidence of the 
murder and watches the police conduct the crime scene investigation.  The 
reporter observes an officer surreptitiously take a knife from the scene and 
slip it into his pocket, clearly obstructing evidence.2 
Two months later, at the trial for the murder, the reporter is subpoe-
naed to testify.  He refuses, asserting the reporter’s  privilege.    As  a  result,  
the  jury  never  learns  of  the  police  officer’s  obstructive  actions.    The  crimi-
nal defendant, who might have been acquitted had the reporter testified, is 
found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without 
the possibility of parole.3 
A   criminal   defendant’s   right   to   a   fair   trial   is   inscribed   in   the   Sixth  
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confront-
ed with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
 
1. E-mail from Mark J. Geragos, Esq., Geragos & Geragos, P.C., to author (Mar. 30, 2012, 
14:29 PST) (on file with author).  
2. Hypothetical created by author.  See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 
1990); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (illustrating examples of media 
ride-alongs with the police). 
3. Hypothetical created by author.  See, e.g.,  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  
2d 577 (Fla. 1990); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934 (illustrating examples of reporters who went on ride-
alongs  and  subsequently  refused  to  testify  by  asserting  the  reporter’s  privilege). 
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for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.4 
The   reporter’s   privilege,   a   lesser   but   nonetheless   recognized   right,   now  
stands in the way of that constitutional right.5 
B.  A Need for an Exception to the Privilege 
Privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient 
privilege,  and   the  reporter’s  privilege  are  established  to  encourage  candor  
within those practice areas.6  However,  the  reporter’s  privilege, more than 
the  others,   infringes  upon  a  criminal  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.7  Be-
cause police departments allow media members to ride along with them 
during critical events such as crime scene investigations, reporters are often 
exposed to evidence that is crucial for the defense.8  However, those report-
ers frequently refuse to testify during the subsequent criminal trial.9 
During a media ride-along, the police department allows a member of 
the  media  to  “ride  along”  with  them  in  the  course  of  their daily activities.10  
 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
5. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating that the judicial 
system  “depend[s]  on   full  disclosure  of   all   the   facts,  within   the   framework  of   the   rules  of   evi-
dence.  To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory 
process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the 
defense.”).    If  reporters  are  allowed  to  refuse  to  testify,  they  may  be  withholding critical facts.  Id.  
Therefore,   the   privilege   stands   in   the  way  of   the   defendant’s   right   to   a   fair   trial.  Id.; see also 
Delaney,   789   P.2d   at   937   (“[A]   newsperson’s   protection   under   the   shield   law  must   yield   to   a  
criminal  defendant’s  constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial  when  the  newsperson’s  refusal  to  disclose  
information  would  unduly  infringe  on  that  right.”). 
6. See United  States  v.  Shibley,  112  F.  Supp.  734,  741  (S.D.  Cal.  1953)  (“The  object  of  the  
[attorney-client]  privilege   is   to  protect   the  client  against  disclosure  of   confidential  matters.”);;  3  
BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHART. CRIMINAL EVID. § 11:47 (15th ed. 
1999)  (“Moreover,  the  purpose  of  the  [physician-patient] privilege is to protect the patient  .  .  .  .”);;  
2 LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 16-1  (4th  ed.  2011)   (“[J]ournalists  and  
news organizations in the United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from 
compelled disclosure  of  information  .  .  .  .”). 
7. See generally Nixon, 418  U.S.  at  709  (stating  that  the  judicial  system  “depend[s]  on  full  
disclosure  of  all  the  facts    .  .  .  .”).    If  reporters  are  allowed  to  refuse  to  testify,  they  may  be  with-
holding critical facts.  See generally id.  Therefore, the privilege stands in the way of the defend-
ant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.  See generally id. 
8. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (stating that a reporter on a media ride-along was present during 
the search of defendant, and subsequently was subpoenaed to testify to whether defendant con-
sented to the search or not). 
9. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 
So. 2d 577; Jean Guccione, Writer Must Testify in Blake Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at B3. 
10. See Karen M. Markin, An   “Unholy   Alliance”:      The Law of Media Ride-Alongs, 12 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 33, 33 n.4 (2004). 
08. HOVSEPIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2012  1:04 AM 
338 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:335 
Media members take footage of crime scene investigations,11 photograph 
houses during the execution of search warrants,12 participate in witness in-
terviews,13 and record detailed notes of their observations.14  While some of 
this information is released in newspaper articles and news programs, some 
significant details remain secrets with the reporter.15 
This  Article   proposes   an   exception   to   the   reporter’s   privilege   that  
would only apply to reporters who have participated in media ride-alongs 
and who have been subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case.  Section II 
will trace the historical development of media ride-alongs and their in-
teraction with criminal cases.  Section III will explore the history of the 
reporter’s  privilege,   including   its development and limitations.  Finally, 
Section IV will suggest that in order to ensure a fair trial for the criminal 
defendant, reporters who participate in media ride-alongs should be re-
quired to preserve and produce at trial all notes taken during media ride-
alongs.  Incidentally, this narrow exception would protect the underlying 
policy   of   the   reporter’s   privilege16 while simultaneously protecting the 
rights of criminal defendants.17 
 
11. See People v. Hendrix, 820 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing that ABC 
Network filmed footage associated with a homicide while on a ride-along). 
12. See Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (explaining that a CBS cameraman filmed for twenty 
minutes during the execution of a search warrant).  
13. Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence at 8, People v. Blake, No. LA040377 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 2004) (stating that reporter Miles Corwin participated in witness interviews). 
14. Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (stating that the reporter was present and 
took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine). 
15. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937, 953 (explaining that the reporter was with the police 
when the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of 
the few people who knew exactly what happened.  Although the reporter wrote an article regard-
ing the arrest, that article did not address the issue of consent.). 
16. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  con-
fidences will not be revealed, but the defendant being subject to a search warrant has no reasona-
ble expectation of confidentiality pertaining to the reporter at that time.  Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F. 
Supp.  2d  1114,  1116  (C.D.  Cal.  2005)  (stating  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  promote  the  “free  
flow  of   information”);;   see also In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  189,  193   (D.D.C.  2011)   (“Courts  
have minimized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect 
on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).     However,  reporters  who  participate  in  
media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meeting or photo shoot.  See, 
e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were accompanying the police with 
the  police’s  permission).    The  reporter is present as a mere observer, not a confidant.  See, e.g., 
Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that reporter 
Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation). 
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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II.  A NEW PHENOMENON:  THE MEDIA RIDE-ALONG 
Generally,  the  reporter’s privilege allows reporters to refuse to testify 
about confidential sources and specific information obtained in the news-
gathering process.18  The development of this privilege stems from a com-
bination of the First Amendment, state statutes, and case law.19 
The media has become increasingly intertwined with the judicial sys-
tem.20  In   light   of   the   public’s   insatiable   appetite   for   news   regarding   the  
criminal justice system,21 police departments are now frequently allowing 
media  members  to  go  on  a  “ride”22—and the “ride”  referred  to  is  not  just  a  
tour of the streets.23  Instead, members of the media are exposed to arrests, 
executions of warrants, accident reports, and abuse incidents.24  During this 
“ride,”  reporters  are  allowed  to  take  notes  and  film  footage  for  use  in sub-
sequent articles and television clips.25 
However, it is not mandatory for the reporters to produce the material 
obtained during the ride-along upon demand—the   reporter’s   privilege   al-
lows them to refuse any request for disclosure of confidential sources or 
 
18. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-1   (“[J]ournalists   and   news   organizations   in   the  
United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from compelled disclosure of 
information  .  .  .  .”). 
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1990); 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901-09 (1991); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603 (1999); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 
1958); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990).  
20. RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE:  CRIM. JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA 
FRENZY 1 (2d ed. 2007), available at https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d9507ee3854.pdf 
(“Starting  around  1990,  Americans  began  to  repeatedly  focus  on  lengthy, high-profile, often ce-
lebrity-centered criminal and civil trials and investigations.  Many of these cases at times resem-
bled something like national obsessions and were associated with extraordinary levels of mass 
media  coverage.”). 
21. See id. at 2–5. 
22. Markin, supra note 10, at 33 n.4. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining 
that the CBS news crew was invited to attend the execution of a search warrant); Miami Herald 
Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  2d  577,  578  (Fla.  1990)  (stating  that  the  journalist  was  allowed  to  
accompany the police to the airport). 
24. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (explaining that the CBS news crew was invited to 
attend the execution of a search warrant); Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (stating 
that the journalist was allowed to accompany the police to the airport). 
25. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (discussing that the journalist 
produced an article after witnessing an arrest at the airport while on a ride-along); Delaney, 789 
P.2d at 937 (stating that the reporter published an article on an incident observed while on a ride-
along at the Long Beach Mall).   
08. HOVSEPIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2012  1:04 AM 
340 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:335 
private information.26  This refusal is allowed despite the fact that the re-
porter is exposed to an enormous amount of information during the ride-
along,   and   that   producing   that   information  would   further   the   defendant’s  
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.27  Therefore, in light of the criminal 
defendant’s   constitutional   rights   at   stake,   it   should   be  mandatory   that   re-
porters on ride-alongs produce their notes and footage when subpoenaed in 
order to ensure a fair trial for the criminal defendant.28 
A.  A Brief History of the Media Ride-along and  
Its  Relationship  with  the  Reporter’s  Privilege 
In  an  effort  to  educate  community  members  regarding  police  officers’  
daily   duties,   police   departments   allow  “ride-alongs.”29  These ride-alongs 
are not only available to the general public, but to the media as well.30  It is 
quite simple to apply for the opportunity.31  For example, the Los Angeles 
City Police Department only requires applicants to complete and submit a 
one-page  form  titled  “Ride-Along Agreement Assuming Risk of Injury or 
Damage  Waiver,  Indemnity  and  Release  of  Claims.”32  The agreement re-
quires standard contact information—such as name, address, and phone 
number—and a signature releasing the City of Los Angeles and the Police 
Department from liability in the event of an injury or resulting damage.33 
Other municipalities have more onerous requirements.34  For exam-
ple, the City of New York Police Department requires the applicant to re-
lease the City of New York from potential lawsuits and to abide by certain 
 
26. See U.S.  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Comm’n  v.  McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 
2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2005); see also LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-1  (“[J]ournalists  and  news  
organizations in the United States today enjoy, in many circumstances, a privilege from com-
pelled  disclosure  of  information  .  .  .  .”). 
27. Delaney,  789  P.2d  at  937  (“[A]  newsperson’s  protection  under  the  shield  law  must  yield  
to  a  criminal  defendant’s constitutional  right  to  a  fair  trial  when  the  newsperson’s  refusal  to  dis-
close information  would  unduly  infringe  on  that  right.”).   
28. See id. 
29. See Ride-Along, MANASSAS PARK POLICE, http://manassasparkpolice.com/ride-along.htm 
(last modified Sept. 4, 2011). 
30. See Los Angeles City Police Department, Ride-Along Agreement Assuming Risk of Inju-




34. See, e.g., Community Affairs | Community Participation Programs, NYPD,  http://www. 
nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/community_affairs/community_participation_programs.shtml (last visit-
ed Dec. 7, 2012) (referencing Ride Along Program portion of website).  
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rules of conduct.35  The  application  provides  that  “the  use  of  cameras,   re-
cording devices and cell phones are prohibited.”36  In addition, the applica-
tion   requires   that   “[m]embers   of   the  Media . . . must state, on a separate 
sheet, the reason(s) for participating  in  the  Ride  Along  [sic].”37  Additional 
requirements, such as a separate explanation of the reason for a ride-along, 
are required in some departments, and suggest that some police depart-
ments are aware of the negative implications of the media ride-along.38 
Indeed, unforeseen consequences have led to lawsuits that clarify the 
legal scope of ride-alongs.39  For instance, on April 16, 1992, the United 
States Marshals Service invited a Washington Post reporter and photogra-
pher to witness the execution of a search warrant against Dominic Wil-
son.40  After realizing that Wilson was not in the house, the Marshals left 
with the media crew, but not before the reporter investigated the house and 
the photographer took a few pictures.41  The United States Supreme Court 
found   that   although   the  media’s   presence   sufficed   as   a   violation   of  Wil-
son’s  Fourth  Amendment  rights,42 the Court had not previously made clear 
that such a presence would constitute a violation, and, therefore did not 
hold the police liable.43  However, the Court  did  discuss  the  media’s  pres-
ence at length and concluded that the reasons provided by the police for the 
media ride-along in that case were not justified.44  Wilson was not the first, 
nor will it be the last civil case to stem from a media ride-along.45 
Criminal defendants have also taken issue with the presence of the 
media in their homes or during arrests.46  In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Morejon, a Miami Herald journalist witnessed an arrest for possession of 
 
35. Id.  
36. Id. (emphasis added). 
37. Id.  
38. Id. 
39. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. 603; Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; 
Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d 577. 
40. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607. 
41. Id. at 607–08 (confirming that photographs were taken while on the ride-along, but nev-
er published). 
42. Id. at 614. 
43. Id. at 617–18. 
44. Id. at 611–14. 
45. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 577–78 (discussing a criminal de-
fendant bringing civil suit against a reporter to compel testimony regarding notes taken while on a 
ride-along).  
46. See, e.g., id.; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149. 
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cocaine during a media ride-along.47  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed 
the  district  court’s  denial  of  a  reporter’s  privilege  assertion,  but  noted  Justice  
White’s  distinction  in  Branzburg v. Hayes that the restriction only applied to 
“grand  jury  investigations  conducted  in  good  faith.”48  More specifically, the 
court  cited  Justice  Powell’s  concurring  opinion,  which  stated  that  on  a  case-
by-case  basis,   the  “‘privilege  should  be   judged  on   its   facts  by  striking   the  
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citi-
zens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.’”49 
Robert  Blake’s  2005  murder  trial  further  addressed  the  new  phenome-
non of media ride-alongs.50  Former Los Angeles Times reporter Miles Cor-
win spent a year shadowing the Los Angeles Police Department while doing 
research for his book.51  As a result, Corwin was present during the homi-
cide investigation of Robert Blake for the murder of his wife in 2001.52  
Subsequently, Corwin was subpoenaed to testify in the Blake trial.53  Cor-
win attempted to raise the reporter’s  privilege  as  his  shield,  but  the  court  de-
 
47. Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578.  The journalist was given permission to 
accompany the Metro-Dade police officers while on duty at the Miami International Airport.  Id.  
The officers arrested Morejon for trafficking in four kilos of cocaine.  Id.  The journalist took 
notes while the arrest occurred and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic 
Magazine containing some information that was inconsistent with what the police officers had 
reported.  Id.  During  his  trial,  Morejon  learned  of  the  journalist’s  eyewitness  account and sub-
poenaed him to appear for a deposition.  Id.  Although the journalist filed a motion to quash the 
subpoena, the judge denied the motion and demanded he testify.  Id.  The journalist petitioned the 
district court for a writ of certiorari, but the  district  court  denied  the  motion,  holding  that  the  “re-
porter’s  qualified  privilege  simply  ‘has  utterly  no  application  to  information  learned  by  a  journal-
ist as a result of being  an  eyewitness  to  a  relevant  event  in  a  subsequent  court  proceeding’  such  as 
the  police  search  and  arrest  of  Morejon.”    Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578. 
48. Id. at 579, 582. 
49. Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., con-
curring)); see also Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 149.  The United States Secret Service allowed a CBS 
crew to accompany it during the execution of a search warrant.  Id. at 151.  Although the defend-
ant Ayeni was not home at the time of invasion, CBS captured footage of his wife and son despite 
their request otherwise.  Id. at 151–52.  Ayeni requested the CBS footage, believing the evidence 
would help in his motion to dismiss the indictment, but CBS refused,  claiming  a  reporter’s  privi-
lege under New York Civil Rights Law Section 79-h.  Id. at 151.  Recognizing that the privilege 
is not absolute and can be overcome if the three-pronged test discussed later in this article is satis-
fied, the court held that the requested videotapes were not obtainable elsewhere and were neces-
sary and thus must be produced, but allowed CBS to obscure the identity of any confidential 
sources it had agreed to protect.  Id. at 154, 160–61. 
50. Guccione, supra note 9; see also Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, 
supra note 13, at 8 (discussing that reporter Miles Corwin, participating in a ride-along, was 
present  during  the  investigation  of  Robert  Blake’s  home for evidence relating to the murder of 
his  wife.    Corwin  asserted  his  reporter’s  privilege  when  asked  to  testify  regarding  the  events  of  
the investigation.).   
51. Guccione, supra note 9. 
52. Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8. 
53. See Guccione, supra note 9.  
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nied him the privilege.54  The  court  ruled  that  “Corwin  had  waived  his  shield  
law  rights”  because  of  a  signed  agreement  between  Corwin  and  the  Los  An-
geles  Police  Department  explaining  “that  his  work  product may be subject 
to subpoena and production in either criminal and/or civil litigation.”55 
If   the   reporter’s   privilege   exists   to  maintain   the   flow   of   truthful   in-
formation to the public,56 then the truth should also be communicated dur-
ing the criminal defendant’s   trial.57  As in the case of Miles Corwin,58 
courts must require reporters to continue this flow of information where 
necessary.59  Therefore, it is vital to appreciate why this privilege exists and 
to understand that the reasons to expose the information obtained during a 
media ride-along outweigh the policy justifications behind the privilege. 
B.  A Philosophical Interjection:  
Why Are Reporters Even Allowed on Ride-alongs? 
If the reasons for concealing information outweighed the benefits, then 
one might   understand   why   the   reporter’s   privilege   would   be   upheld   in   a  
criminal case.60  However, they do not.61  The Wilson v. Layne opinion illu-
minates the reasoning behind the media ride-along.62  Similarly, other possi-
ble justifications for the media ride-along are thoroughly analyzed in the arti-
cle,   “An   ‘Unholy   Alliance’:  The Law of Media Ride-Alongs.”63  While 
Wilson and “An ‘Unholy Alliance’” take different approaches, they ultimate-
ly conclude that there is no legitimate justification for a media ride-along.64 
 
54. Id. 
55. See id. (explaining that according to the agreement Corwin signed with the police de-
partment,  “[he]  understood  ‘that  his  work  product  may  be  subject  to  subpoena  and production in 
either   criminal   and/or   civil   litigation’   and  acknowledged   that,   ‘by  his   involvement   in   homicide  
investigations,  [he]  becomes  an  “agent”  of  the  Police  Department.’”    In  accordance  with  this  find-
ing, a reporter should understand that he or she  waives  his  or  her  reporter’s  privilege  when  partic-
ipating in a media ride-along.). 
56. See Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
57. See Guccione, supra note 9. 
58. Id. 
59. See Branzburg,  408  U.S.  at  680  (“[A]  reporter  should  not  be  forced  either  to appear or 
testify  before  a  grand  jury  or  at  trial  until  and  unless  sufficient  grounds  are  shown  .  .  .  .”). 
60. See id. (“[A]  reporter  should  not  be  forced  either  to  appear  or  testify  before a grand jury 
or  at  trial  until  and  unless  sufficient  grounds  are  shown  .  .  .  .”). 
61. See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. 
62. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–13. 
63. Markin, supra note 10. 
64. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–14; Markin, supra note 10, at 37. 
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1.  Wilson v. Layne:  The  United  States  Supreme  Court’s  Opinion on the 
Justifications for Media Ride-Alongs 
In Wilson v. Layne, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
justifications for allowing media ride-alongs during the execution of a 
search warrant.65  The  Court  rejected  the  police  department’s  argument  that  
“officers  should  be  able  to  exercise  reasonable  discretion  about  when  [the  
ride-alongs]  would  ‘further  their  law  enforcement  mission . . . in executing 
a  warrant.’”66  The Court held that allowing media to enter the homes of 
suspects would defeat the underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
and the protection it provides for private homes.67 
The   Court   also   rejected   the   police   department’s   argument   that   be-
cause  the  reporter’s  privilege  stems  from the First Amendment and seeks to 
encourage  a  flow  of  information  to  the  public,  the  “presence  of  third  parties  
could  serve   the   law  enforcement  purpose  of  publicizing   the  government’s  
efforts to combat crime, and facilitate accurate reporting on law enforce-
ment  activities.”68  The Court held that when balancing the First Amend-
ment right with the Fourth Amendment right at stake, the Fourth Amend-
ment right must take precedence.69  Although  “the  need  for  accurate  report-
reporting  on  police   issues”   is   important,   this   interest  “in  general  bears  no  
direct relation to the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into 
a  home  in  order  to  execute  a  felony  arrest  warrant.”70 
The Court also pointed out that the search warrant did not permit the 
media’s   presence   inside the house.71  As the Court explained, the Fourth 
Amendment is a representation of respect—a   “centur[y]-old   principle”—
that is deemed necessary to protect the private home.72  Although the police 
in Wilson had obtained a valid search warrant, the Court found that the 
presence of the media members did not further the objectives that allowed 
the police into the private home pursuant to that warrant.73  For this reason, 
 
65. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–13. 
66. Id. at 612. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at  613  (“Fourth  Amendment  also  protects  a  very  important  right,  and  in  the  present  
case it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs  must  be  judged.”). 
70. Id. 
71. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611. 
72. Id. at 610. 
73. Id. at 611. 
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the  media’s  presence  was  not  in  congruence  with  the   intentions  of   the  re-
spected and superior Fourth Amendment.74 
Finally,  the  police  department  argued  that  the  “presence  of  third  par-
ties could serve . . . to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and al-
so  to  protect  the  safety  of  the  officers.”75  Since the police did not limit this 
argument to  instances  where  the  media  entered  a  suspect’s  home  with  the  
police, this policy could extend beyond media ride-alongs during search 
warrants to arrests that occur outside of the home.76  Although the Court 
found this to be a plausible interest, it nonetheless rejected the police de-
partment’s  argument  because   it  did  not  believe   the  police  department  had  
allowed  the  media  to  videotape  for  “quality  control.”77  Instead, the Court 
found the ride-along was for the benefit of the media company.78 
2.  A Categorical Approach to the Policy Behind Media Ride-Alongs 
In An   “Unholy   Alliance”:   The   Law   of   Media   Ride-Alongs, Karen 
Markin discusses two theories to justify media ride-alongs.79  She purports 
that  “ride-alongs [might serve as a] . . . check on government, a press func-
tion that flows from libertarian theory . . .   [and  might]  satisfy   the  public’s  
right to know, a press function that flows from the social responsibility the-
ory.”80  The  libertarian  theory  values  the  “free  and  open  exchange  of  ideas  
as the best means of  achieving  truth,”81 while the social responsibility theo-
ry   is   based   on   “the   need   of   a   self-governing   people   to   be   informed.”82  
Nonetheless, when analyzed under the First Amendment, neither theory 
justifies the media ride-along.83 
There is insufficient evidence   to  support   the  media’s  claim   that   it   is  
acting   as   a   “watchdog”   during   these   ride-alongs.84  Rather, the media is 
 
74. Id. at 614. 
75. Id. at 613. 
76. The use of suspect protection and monitoring of police actions as a justification for me-
dia ride-alongs  is  not  only  applicable  to  search  warrants;;  the  media’s  presence  during  any  arrest  
or investigation may lead to suspect protection.  See generally id. 
77. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613. 
78. Id. 
79. Markin, supra note 10, at 34. 
80. Id.   
81. Id. (quoting Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government 
Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1982)). 
82. Id. at 35 (quoting Helle, supra note 81). 
83. Id. at 36. 
84. Id. 
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“colluding  with  the  government  when  it  rides  along.”85  This is contrary to 
the libertarian theory that requires the media to serve as a check on the 
government.86  Similarly, the social responsibility theory does not support 
ride-alongs, as there is no real promotion of democracy with the accompa-
nying of media.87  In fact, instead of guarding the rights of suspects during 
police intrusion, the reporter’s  presence  serves  only  to  benefit  the  reporter’s  
own financial and entertainment purposes.88 
In conclusion, neither the United States Supreme Court, nor Markin 
could find a sufficient justification for media ride-alongs.89  Media ride-
alongs are mainly a benefit to the reporter.90 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
A.  What  Is  the  Reporter’s  Privilege  and  Why  Does  It  Exist? 
The  First  Amendment’s  right  to  freedom  of  the  press  is  at  the  core  of  
the  reporter’s  privilege.91  If journalists and reporters were required to dis-
close their sources of confidential information, people would be reluctant to 
give them such information.92  This would have a chilling effect on a re-
porter’s  work  product.93  As  a  result,  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  pro-
tect journalists and reporters from being forced to disclose sources and in-
 
85. Markin, supra note 10, at 36. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 36–37. 
88. Id. 
89. See generally Wilson, 526 U.S. 603; see also Markin, supra note 10, at 60. 
90. Markin, supra note 10, at 60 (concluding that the ride-along is not justified under the 
libertarian theory or the social responsibility  theory.    Instead,  it  serves  the  media’s  interests.). 
91. See U.S. CONST. amend.  I  (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of  grievances.”)  (emphasis  added); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972); Wright 
v. FBI, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n  v.  McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2005). 
92. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1958) (referring to defendant Tor-
re’s  claim  that  requiring  her  to  testify  would  “impose  an  important  practical  restraint  on  the  flow  
of news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news to 
the  public”);;  see also In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  189,  193  (D.D.C.  2011)  (“Courts  have  mini-
mized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a re-
porter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”). 
93. See In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  at  193  (“Courts  have  minimized  impositions upon the 
press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  
and  gather  news.”). 
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formation  in  an  effort   to  prevent  “disrupting  the  ‘free  flow  of  information  
protected  by  the  First  Amendment.’”94 
While   there   is  no   federal  statute   that   recognizes   the   reporter’s  privi-
lege,95 forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes estab-
lishing  a   reporter’s  privilege,  also  known  as  shield   laws.96  Subsequently, 
case law has defined the privilege so that both reporters and those who are 
in need of the reporters’   testimony  understand   the  privilege  and   the  ways  
around it.97  Case law has established that the privilege is protected by the 
Constitution,   and   has   recognized   “that   society’s   interest   in   protecting   the  
integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of in-
formation to the public, is an interest of sufficient social importance to jus-
tify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administra-
tion  of  justice.”98  Despite  the  occasional  need  for  such  sacrifice,  “[c]ourts  
have  rigorously  protected  reporters  asserting  [this]  privilege.”99 
Among  the  cases  recognizing  the  reporter’s  privilege  is  a  1958  deci-
sion regarding famed actress/singer Judy Garland.100  Garland brought suit 
against  CBS  after  learning  that  a  CBS  executive’s  comments about her had 
been published in an article written by Marie Torre of the New York Herald 
Tribune.101  Torre was imprisoned because she refused to disclose the iden-
tity of the executive who had made the comments.102  On appeal, Torre 
raised the Constitutional   defense   of   the   First   Amendment’s   freedom   of  
speech.103  This was the first time a reporter had raised this defense.104  Tor-
re  argued  that  requiring  her  to  testify  would  “impose  an  important  practical 
restraint on the flow of news from news sources to news media and would 
 
94. McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 31. 
95. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–1. 
96. Number of States with Shield Law Climbs to 40, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM 
PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-law-
summer-2011/number-states-shield-law-climbs (last visited Dec. 8, 2012). 
97. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Garland, 259 F.2d 545; Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. 
Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. 
Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y 1992); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990); Miami Herald 
Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  So.  2d  577  (Fla.  1990);;  Guccione,  supra note 9.  
98. Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (quotation marks omitted).  
99. In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
100. Garland, 259 F.2d 545. 
101. Id. at 547. 
102. Id. 
103. Id.; LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5, 16-6.  Garland was the first case to raise a con-
stitutional  reporter’s  privilege.    Id.  Torre raised the defense because states were hesitant in acknowl-
edging a credible privilege, even though such privilege had been generally codified.  Id. at 16-5.  
104. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-5. 
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thus diminish pro tanto the   flow   of   news   to   the   public.”105  The Second 
Circuit unanimously acknowledged that while the privilege stemmed from 
the freedom of press, since the information sought was at the heart of the 
case and there were no alternative  sources  for  the  information,  “the  Consti-
tution  conferred  no  right  to  refuse  an  answer.”106 
It would not be until 1972 that the United States Supreme Court would 
issue an opinion on the constitutionality of this issue.107  In the case of 
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court clarified the privilege.108  
Branzburg consolidated four separate cases109 that   stemmed   “from   the   re-
peated clashes of the period between government, on the one hand, and al-
legedly violent, politically dissident groups and the so-called  ‘drug  culture,’  
on   the  other.”110  The cases concerned the groups that had confided in re-
porters about specific information pertaining to themselves in exchange for 
the  reporters’  promise  that  their  names  would  remain  confidential.111  In an 
effort to prosecute these groups, the government asked the courts to compel 
the  reporters  to  testify  as  to  the  sources  of  information  regarding  the  groups’  
illegal  and  violent  habits  despite  their  claim  to  a  reporter’s  privilege.112 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that reporters qualify for 
some First Amendment protection, but that the protection is not absolute.113  
The Court explained that reporters are subject to a privilege to avoid a violation 
of their freedom of press and to minimize eliminating the flow of information 
to the public.114  However, the Court refused to find a First Amendment de-
fense applicable in this particular case since the burden of testifying did not 
outweigh the need for law enforcement and effective grand jury proceed-
ings.115  The Court stated: 
 
105. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547–48. 
106. Id. at 550. 
107. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.  
108. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. 
109. Id. at 667–72 (the four consolidated cases were United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 
1081 (9th Cir. 1970), In re Papas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), Branzburg v. Pound, 461 
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), and Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971)).  
110. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-9. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 16-9, 16-10. 
113. Branzburg,   408   U.S.   at   681   (“We   do   not   question   the   significance   of   free   speech,  
press,   or   assembly   to   the   country’s  welfare.     Nor   is   it   suggested   that   news   gathering   does   not  
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, free-
dom  of  the  press  could  be  eviscerated.”). 
114. See id. at 681–82. 
115. Id. at  685  (“It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  the  great  weight  of  authority  is  that  newsmen  
are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions 
relevant  to  a  criminal  investigation.”). 
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[A] reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify 
before a grand jury or at trial until and unless sufficient grounds 
are shown for believing that the reporter possesses information 
relevant to a crime the grand jury is investigating, that the in-
formation the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and 
that the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to 
override the claimed invasion of First Amendment interests oc-
casioned by the disclosure.116 
Despite this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court made clear 
that construction of the privilege would be at the discretion of state legisla-
tures, but with limited restrictions.117  Following the Branzburg opinion, 
many state and federal courts have addressed the scope of the reporter’s  
privilege.118  As  Justice  White   anticipated,   “[s]ooner  or   later,   it  would  be  
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the priv-
ilege.”119  This  Article  addresses  Justice  White’s  suggestion  and  argues  that  
reporters who participate in media ride-alongs and are later asked to testify 
in a criminal trial should be prevented from seeking the protection of the 
reporter’s  privilege. 
B.  The Scope of Enforcement: 
When and Why Has the Privilege Been Enforced? 
Reporters and journalists have not been hesitant in asserting the report-
er’s  privilege.120  The privilege has been raised in cases ranging from defama-
tion suits,121 to First Amendment violations,122 and criminal proceedings.123 
 
116. Id. at 680. 
117. Id. at  706  (“There  is  also  merit   in  leaving  state  legislatures  free,  within  First  Amend-
ment limits, to fashion their own standards  .  .  .  .”). 
118. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 
561 So. 2d 577; Guccione, supra note 9.  
119. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704. 
120. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665; Garland, 259 F.2d 545; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149; 
In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; Hatfill, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33.  The plaintiff in Hatfill sought the 
identities of sources from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice who 
had spoken with the media regarding his alleged involvement with the anthrax letters.  Id. at 36.  
Several media companies, including The New York Times and the Associated Press, were asked to 
reveal   their   source   for   information   regarding   the   plaintiff’s   affiliation  with   anthrax.      Id. at 48.  
Their motion to quash the subpoena was granted since although their knowledge was at the heart 
of the case, the plaintiff had alternative means to acquire that information.  Id. at 49; Delaney, 789 
P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d 577. 
121. See, e.g., Garland, 259 F.2d 545. 
122. See, e.g., In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189.  A street performer requested the deposition 
of   a   newspaper   reporter,   Donovan   Slack,   who   had   written   an   article   regarding   Boston’s   re-
08. HOVSEPIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2012  1:04 AM 
350 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:335 
Compelling a reporter to testify is not uncommon, especially in a crim-
inal case where the reporter was an eyewitness.124  In Delaney v. Superior 
Court, Los Angeles Times reporter Roxana Kopetman and photographer 
Roberto Santiago Bertero accompanied the Long Beach Police Department 
during their daily duties.125  While on duty at the Long Beach Plaza Mall, 
the police officers arrested Sean Patrick Delaney for misdemeanor posses-
sion of brass knuckles.126  Kopetman and Bertero were later subpoenaed to 
testify  regarding  Delaney’s  consent  to  the  search,  but  refused,  asserting  their  
reporter’s  privilege.127  The Supreme Court of California compelled the re-
porter and photographer to testify, and after applying the balancing test, held 
that the factors were overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant.128 
 
strictions on street performers for The Boston Globe.  Id. at 190–91.  The plaintiff requested the 
testimony to help prove that the city had violated his Constitutional right to free speech by re-
stricting the areas.  Id. at 196.  Slack was subpoenaed but refused to comply, asserting his report-
er’s  privilege.      Id. at 192.  The court held that in applying a balancing test, which will later be 
discussed in this article, Slack had correctly asserted his privilege and therefore was not forced to 
comply.  Id. at 198.  Although the information Slack had and could testify to was critical in the 
case, there were alternative means to obtain the same information such as asking local business 
owners or residents.  Id. at 197–98.    Therefore,  the  reporter’s  privilege  was  upheld.    Id. at 198. 
123. See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1999); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; 
People v. Vasco, 131 Cal. App. 4th 137 (2005). 
124. JOEL M. GORA, THE RIGHTS OF REPORTERS:  THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A REPOR-
TER’S RIGHTS 50  (Norman  Dorsen  &  Aryeh  Neier  eds.,  1974)  (“Where  a  reporter  is  an  eyewit-
ness to criminal activity or is told about it directly, courts have been unwilling to interpret the 
shield  laws  to  allow  protection.”). 
125. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937.  Police approached Sean Patrick Delaney after seeing a type 
of plastic bag in his possession commonly used to store drugs.  Id.  After questioning Delaney, 
the officers requested that he provide them with his identification.  Id.  As Delaney reached for 
his belongings, the officers searched his jacket and found a set of brass knuckles.  Id.  A few days 
later, the Los Angeles Times published an article addressing the arrest.  Id.  Although the pub-
lished article did not touch on the issue of consent, it did discuss the interaction between Delaney 
and the officers.  Id.  The court also held that despite the fact that Article I of the California Con-
stitution  states  that  a  “newsperson  shall  not  be  adjudged  in  contempt  for  ‘refusing  to  disclose  any 
unpublished  information[,]’”  a  balancing  test  may  provide  cause  for  a  court  to  compel  a  reporter  
to testify.  Delaney, 789 P.2d at 941, 947–52.  Factors in the balancing test include whether the 
unpublished information is confidential or sensitive, the interests of the reporter, the importance 
of the information to the criminal defendant, and whether alternative sources are available (but 
the court explained   that  “[i]n   light  of   a  defendant’s   constitutional   right   to  a   fair   trial,  however,  
Mitchell [v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 268 (1984)], a civil case, does not mandate a rigid alterna-
tive-source   requirement   in   criminal   proceedings.”).      Id. at 949–51.  A threshold showing of 
whether the issue is at the heart of the case is not required.  Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 937. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 953 (explaining that the information sought was not confidential, revealing the 
information  would  not  impinge  on  the  reporter’s  newsgathering  ability,  the  information  was  im-
portant for Delaney, and that despite not needing to show an absolute lack of alternative sources, 
there were no alternative sources for the information available to Delaney). 
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If all other courts were to follow the conclusion of the Supreme Court 
of  California,   the  exception   to   the  reporter’s  privilege  would  not  be  at   is-
sue.129  However, since states are allowed to develop their own standards 
for  the  reporter’s  privilege,130 there is no promise that they will follow Cali-
fornia’s  lead.    In  fact,  there  is  a  wide  range  of  both  civil  and  criminal  cases  
that  have  addressed  the  reporter’s  privilege  nationwide.131  In some instanc-
es, the privilege has been denied, while in others, the courts have respected 
the   reporter’s   privilege.132  In order to maintain consistency, most courts 
have adopted a three-pronged test to help determine whether the reporter’s  
privilege trumps the subpoena.133 
C.  Compelling a Reporter to Testify 
The  reporter’s  privilege,  commonly  asserted  by  reporters  who  refuse 
to testify about sources and other confidential materials, is subject to a 
three-pronged test that pre-dates Branzburg v. Hayes.134  This test has been 
solidified through decades of case law and legislation.135 
To compel a reporter to testify, there must be   a   “clear   and   specific”  
showing of each element of the test.136  First, the information must be highly 
 
129. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (ordering the reporter who had participated in a ride-
along  to  testify,  but  only  based  on  the  reporter’s  own  observation—it is not a hard and fast rule 
that reporters who attended ride-alongs must testify during subsequent criminal proceedings if 
asked to do so). 
130. Branzburg,  408  U.S.  at  706  (“There  is  also  merit  in  leaving  state  legislatures  free,  with-
in  First  Amendment  limits,  to  fashion  their  own  standards  .  .  .  .”). 
131. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189; Mil-
ler, 986 P.2d 170; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. Greenberg, 511 N.E.2d 
1116, 1117–21 (N.Y. 1987) (confirming, when a television station moved to quash a subpoena to 
produce  videotapes  of  an  interview  with  a  homicide  suspect,  that  there  is  “a  strong  desire  to  safe-
guard  the  free  channels  of  news  communication  .   .   .   .”     With  this  understanding, the court held 
that since   “the   taped   interview   presumably   contain[ed]   relevant   information   necessary   to   the  
Grand  Jury  investigation  and  [the  information  was]  unavailable  from  other  sources,”  the  report-
er’s  privilege  would  not  protect  the  television station.). 
132. Compare Delaney, 789 P.2d 934 (holding that journalists must testify despite assertion 
of  reporter’s  privilege),  with People v. Slover, 753 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that 
the photographer did not have to produce photos because privilege was properly asserted). 
133. James C. Goodale et al., Reporter’s  Privilege, 987 PLI/PAT 135, 160 (2009); see also 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906 (1991); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1990); 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947. 
134. Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743. 
135. Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947. 
136. In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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material and relevant to the underlying claim;137 the information cannot be 
“merely   cumulative,”138 nor   can   it   be   “vague   and  wholly   unsupported.”139  
Second, the information must be necessary or critical to the maintenance of 
the  party’s  claim.140  In  other  words,  the  information  must  be  at  the  “heart  of  
the  case.”141  In Delaney, however, the Supreme Court of California lowered 
this standard for criminal cases so that  “a  criminal  defendant  must  show  a  
reasonable possibility the  information  will  materially  assist  his  defense,”142 
not that the information affected the heart of his case.143  Lastly, the party 
compelling disclosure must have exhausted all other alternative sources of 
obtaining the information.144  However, the court in Delaney lowered this 
standard   as  well,   concluding   “a  universal   and   inflexible alternative-source 
requirement is inappropriate in a criminal proceeding.”145 
Furthermore, most states have adopted some variation of the report-
er’s  privilege,  and,  in  doing  so,  have  given  depth  to  the  scope  of  the  privi-
lege.146  However,   reporter’s   privilege   statutes   in  California,   Illinois,   and  
 
137. Id.; see also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Delaney, 789 P.2d at 
947; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160. 
138. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 667, 670 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).  
139. In re Application of Behar, 779 F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
140. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 7; see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 
713; Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160. 
141. See Miller v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 602 F. Supp. 675, 676–81 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (ex-
plaining that parties to the case requested a reporter to disclose the source of information relating 
to  a  death.     Since  this  information  was  at   the  core  of  the  plaintiff’s  theory,   the  court  found  that  
“names  of   the  confidential   source  and  witness not only go to the  heart  of  plaintiff’s   case,   they  
very well may be the heart of the case.”);;  see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713; Goodale et al., supra 
note 133, at 160. 
142. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948. 
143. Id. 
144. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 7; see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 
713; Goodale et al., supra note 133, at 160; In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (holding that the 
plaintiff had not exhausted all alternative sources for information regarding street performance 
conditions because he had not sought the information from residents, local business owners, or 
other street vendors); In re Ramaekers, 33 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (indicating the 
movants requested Reuters News Services to produce all tapes and documents relating to an inter-
view made for a securities litigation inquiry.  Since there was no other available source for this 
information, the court found that the movant had exhausted all possible alternatives in an attempt 
to obtain the necessary information.); Miller, 602 F. Supp. at 680 (holding that the requirement of 
exhausting all alternative sources had been satisfied when plaintiff had deposed all possible wit-
nesses before trial and had reviewed results from other investigations). 
145. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 951. 
146. LEVINE ET AL., supra note 6, at 16-4, 16-5. 
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New York, demonstrate that variations exist between the states.147  For ex-
ample, New York draws clear distinctions between an absolute protection 
for confidential information,148 and a qualified protection for non-
confidential information,149 while California adopts a more general protec-
tion for all information.150  Moreover, Illinois has separated the reporter’s  
privilege among nine different statutes, each of which expands upon a spe-
cific type of information.151  Despite their differences, most states have 
been faced with criminal cases in which reporters who participated in me-
dia ride-alongs witnessed an arrest and refused to testify.152 
 
147. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW § 79-h. 
148. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)   (“Exemption of professional journalists and news-
casters from contempt:  Absolute protection for confidential news.  Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist . . . shall be ad-
judged in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by the 
legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist 
or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature or other body having contempt powers 
for refusing or failing to disclose any news obtained or received in confidence or the identity of 
the source of any such news coming into such person’s  possession  in  the  course  of  gathering  or  
obtaining news for publication or to be published . . . .”). 
149. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c)   (“Exemption   of   professional   journalists   and   news-
casters from contempt:  Qualified protection for nonconfidential news.  Notwithstanding the pro-
visions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist or newscaster . . . 
shall be adjudged in contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, 
or by the legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a 
journalist or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature, or other body having contempt 
powers for refusing or failing to disclose any unpublished news obtained or prepared by a jour-
nalist or newscaster in the course of gathering or obtaining news as provided in subdivision (b) of 
this section, or the source of any such news, where such news was not obtained or received in 
confidence  .  .  .  .”).   
150. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b)  (“A  publisher,  editor,  reporter  .  .  .  shall  not  be  adjudged  in  
contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any other body having the power to 
issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source of any information . . . or for refusing to dis-
close any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of 
information for communication  to  the  public.”). 
151. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901  (“Source  of  Information”);;  735   ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/8-902  (“Definitions”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-903  (“Application  to  Court”);;  735  ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/8-904  (“Contents  of  Applications”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-905  (“Civil  Proceeding”);;  
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906   (“Consideration   by   Court”);;   735   ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 
(“Court’s  Findings”);;  735   ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-908  (“Privilege  Continues  During  Pendency  of  
Appeal”);;  735  ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-909  (“Contempt”). 
152. See, e.g., Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 658 (holding that because the defendant did not rea-
sonably   show   that   the   information  would  materially   assist   her   defense,   the   reporter’s   privilege  
was upheld); Slover, 753 N.E.2d 554 (noting that a newspaper was asked to submit unpublished 
photographs associated with a murder  but  refused  to  do  so,  claiming  a  reporter’s  privilege.    The  
lower  court  held  that  the  reporter’s  privilege  did  not  apply  in  such  matters.    On  appeal,  the  Appel-
late Court of Illinois concluded that photographers were analogous to reporters in that photo-
graphs were a source of information, and thus the lower court erred in its ruling.  The information 
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Despite the variety between state statutes, none of the statutes create 
an absolute exemption from the privilege for media ride-along partici-
pants.153  Some cases, like Delaney, have indirectly asserted this exception 
by lowering the standards of the three-pronged test, thus compelling report-
ers to testify.154  However, a more concrete exemption is necessary.  The 
media ride-along has helped further the free flow of information; in return 
for this benefit, reporters who participate in media ride-alongs should 
waive  their  right  to  assert  the  reporter’s  privilege. 
IV.  HOW TO ADJUST TO THE PHENOMENON OF RIDE-ALONGS 
Media ride-alongs have had a significant impact on the judicial sys-
tem.155  As with all other rapidly evolving forms of communication, such as 
e-mail, and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter,156 the Supreme 
Court or Congress must adjust to the prevalence of media ride-alongs.  They 
should mandate that reporters who are allowed to go on media ride-alongs 
be   exempt   from   the   reporter’s   privilege   and   be   required   to   maintain   any  
notes and information gathered during these ride-alongs to provide a fair tri-
al for criminal defendants.157  This proposed exception will not only protect 
a   criminal  defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment right to a fair trial but will also 
maintain the freedom of press firmly established by the First Amendment.158 
 
was  in  fact  protected  by  the  reporter’s  privilege.);;  People  v.  Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. App. 
1993) (mentioning that the police requested helicopter media coverage of marijuana bust). 
153. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; see, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW § 79-h(c). 
154. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953. 
155. Guccione, supra note 9; see, e.g., United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992);;  Delaney  v.  Superior  Court,  789  P.2d  934  (Cal.  1990);;  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon, 
561 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1990); People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (Ct. App. 2005); People v. Slover, 
753 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo. App. 1993). 
156. Darren Waters, Social  Networks  “Are  New  E-mail”, BBC (Mar. 15, 2009), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7942304.stm. 
157. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  con-
fidences will not be revealed, but a defendant being subjected to a search warrant has no reasona-
ble expectation of confidentially pertaining to the reporter at that time.  See Wright v. F.B.I., 381 
F.  Supp.  2d  1114,  1116   (C.D.  Cal.  2005)   (stating   the   reporter’s  privilege   exists   to  promote   the  
“free   flow   of   information”);;   see also In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“Courts have minimized impositions upon the press, particularly when burdens may have a 
chilling  effect  on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).    However,  reporters  who  
participate in media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meeting or photo 
shoot.  See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were accompanying the 
police  with  the  police’s  permission).    The  reporter  is  present  as  a  mere  observer,  not  a  confidant.    
See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that 
reporter Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation). 
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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A.  Reporters on Ride-Alongs Lose Their Privilege and  
Enter  the  Class  of  “Police” 
Members of the media become constructive members of the police 
force when they partake in ride-alongs.  When police officers arrest some-
one, they write an incident report.159  If the prosecution files a case against 
the individual who was arrested, the police officers may be subpoenaed to 
testify to the events of that arrest.160  This procedure exists as part of the de-
fendant’s  right  to  a  fair   trial.161  Reporters or journalists should be subject 
to the same rule.  The notes they take during these media ride-alongs are 
just like the incident reports that the police officers write.162  During the 
ride-along, the reporters and journalists record every incident that may later 
lead to a criminal arrest.163  Just like police incident reports, these recorded 
initial incidents can become crucial facts in a criminal proceeding.164 
Moreover, some police departments acknowledge that a person on a 
ride-along becomes a member of the police force.165  For example, before 
Los Angeles Times reporter Miles Corwin could accompany the Los Ange-
les Police Department for a year, he was required to sign an agreement.166  
Specifically,  the  agreement  stated  that  “by his involvement in homicide in-
vestigations,  [he]  becomes  an  ‘agent’  of  the  Police  Department.”167 
Finally, any media member who accompanies police officers should 
be thought of as an agent of the police department because the police de-
 
159. Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions:  Police Officer, LAPD, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/join_the_team/content_basic_view/9127#Police%20Officer (last visit-
ed Dec. 10, 2012). 
160. See Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions:  Police Officer, supra note 
159; FAQ, NYPD, http://www.nypdrecruit.com/faq (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).  
161. If   the  judicial  system  “depend[s]  on  full  disclosure  of  all   the  facts,”  then  police  testi-
mony of facts helps ensure that all facts are disclosed.  See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
162. Compare Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions:  Police Officer, su-
pra note 159 (stating that the duties of police officers include conducting investigations, prepar-
ing investigative reports, and writing crime reports), with Notice of Motion and Motion to Sup-
press Evidence, supra note  13,  at  24  (citing  to  Miles  Corwin’s  commentary  regarding  the  interior  
of  Robert  Blake’s  house). 
163. See, e.g., Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151 (CBS cameraman filmed for twenty minutes dur-
ing a search warrant). 
164. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (stating that a reporter on a media ride-along that 
was present during the search of defendant was later subpoenaed to testify to whether defendant 
consented to the search). 
165. Guccione, supra note 9.   
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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partment’s  resources  allow  the  reporter  to  obtain  his  or  her  information.168  
For example, search warrants allow reporters to enter the homes of private 
residents.169  The  police  department’s  communication  system  also leads re-
porters to locations where crimes may occur.170  Additionally, the tips from 
police department insiders result in drug busts.171  Without the approval and 
insight of the police department, members of the media who go on ride-
alongs with the police would not have access to such information.172  For 
this reason, upon entering the police car, members of the media should step 
out of their role as reporters and into the class of the police. 
B.  The Exception Satisfies the Three-Pronged Test 
The party seeking the  “privileged”  information  must  prove  that  (1)  the  
information is highly material and relevant, (2) the information is necessary 
or   critical   to   the  maintenance   of   the   party’s   claim,   and   (3)   all   alternative  
sources of the information have been exhausted.173  As demonstrated be-
low, there is no question that any time a criminal defendant requests the 
notes or coverage of an eyewitness reporter present during a media ride-
along, all three prongs are satisfied. 
First, the information reporters gather during media ride-alongs is 
highly material and relevant; otherwise, the criminal defendant would 
not be requesting the material.174  The criminal defendant has a right un-
der the Sixth Amendment to call witnesses in his favor and to question 
those against him.175  A criminal defendant would not request that the ju-
ry   hear   the   testimony  of   a   reporter   unless   it  was   in   the   defendant’s   fa-
 
168. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999); Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151–
52 (illustrating that the camera crew entered the house along with the police pursuant to a 
search warrant). 
169. See, e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151–52. 
170. See generally Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 579. 
171. See, e.g., Henderson, 847 P.2d at 240 (explaining that the police requested helicopter 
media coverage of marijuana bust). 
172. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (explaining that the journalist, 
participating on a media ride-along, took notes while the police arrested the defendant for traf-
ficking in cocaine and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine). 
173. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1990); see also 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/8-906 (1991). 
174. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police when 
the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the 
few people who knew exactly what happened). 
175. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
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vor.176  Even if that were not the case, requesting information by an ob-
jective  party  about  the  events  leading  up  to  the  defendant’s  arrest,  by its 
own terms, renders the information highly material.177  A  reporter’s  notes  
taken during ride-alongs can help determine what exactly happened, 
what the circumstances were, and how the events of the accident, arrest, 
or search took place, which is highly material information during a crim-
inal trial.178 
For similar reasons, the second prong is also satisfied.179  The expo-
sure of this material is highly critical and necessary if a criminal defendant 
is requesting it.180  This is true if only for the mere fact that it allows the de-
fendant to exercise his constitutional right to subpoena evidence he be-
lieves will be in his favor.181  In a criminal case, all admissible and relevant 
evidence is needed to ensure a verdict is returned in the fairest manner to 
the defendant —whether it helps prove or disprove guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.182  The standard for this prong may be even lower if the holding 
in Delaney v. Superior Court is adopted.183  There,   the  court  held   that  “a  
 
176. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police when 
the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the 
few people who knew exactly what happened).  See generally Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. 
177. Rock,  483  U.S.  at  51  (“A  person’s  right  to  reasonable  notice  of  a  charge  against  him,  
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in our system 
of jurisprudence; and these rights include, at a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against 
him,  to  offer  testimony,  and  to  be  represented  by  counsel.”)  (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
273 (1948)) (emphasis omitted). 
178. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (noting that the reporter was 
present when police first encountered the defendant at the airport and arrested him for trafficking 
in cocaine); Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (discussing that the reporter was with the police when the 
police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of the few 
other people who knew exactly what happened). 
179. The information requested must be necessary or critical to the maintenance of the par-
ty’s   claim.     See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW § 79-h(c). 
180. See generally Rock,   483  U.S.   at   52   (discussing   the   defendant’s   compulsory right to 
subpoena information in his or her favor). 
181. See id. at 52. 
182. See generally Delaney,  789  P.2d  at  948  (“A  criminal  defendant’s  constitutional right to 
compulsory process was intended to permit him to request governmental assistance in obtaining 
likely helpful evidence, not just evidence that he can show beforehand will go to the heart of his 
case.  The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and 
comprehensive.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
183. Id. (“[T]o  overcome  a  prima  facie  showing  by  a  newsperson  that  he  is  entitled  to  with-
hold information under the shield law, a criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility 
the information will materially assist his defense.  A criminal defendant is not required to show 
that   the   information   goes   to   the   heart   of   his   case.”);;   see also Notice of Motion and Motion to 
Suppress Evidence, supra note  13,  at  24  (“Mr.  Blake  need  not show a reasonable possibility the 
information will lead to his exoneration:  he need only show, rather, a reasonable possibility the 
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criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility the information will 
materially  assist  his  defense.”184  Since the higher standard is satisfied, the 
lower standard will be fulfilled as well.185 
Finally, the information reporters observe during media ride-alongs is 
unique, and no alternative source is available for that same information.186  
If the standard to be applied is like the one discussed in Delaney,187 it is 
clear that this prong is satisfied.  In Delaney,  the  court  found  that  the  “uni-
versal and inflexible alternative-source requirement is inappropriate in a 
criminal  proceeding.”188  With a more lax standard, it will be easier to con-
clude that the few people permitted to be present during an arrest or police 
encounter, the privileged reporter being one of them, greatly limits the 
number of potential sources of information.189 
However, the prong is still satisfied even if a higher standard is ap-
plied.190  There are only a few people who will have observed an accident, 
arrest, and/or search—the parties to the case, the police officers, and the 
media.191  The police officers will write their incident reports and the report-
ers will take down their notes.192  While it may be argued that the incident 
reports are an alternative means to gather information observed by the re-
porter, the bias present in the incident reports will presumably be absent in 
 
information will materially assist  his  defense,”  and  that  “balancing  the  various  factors in this case 
weighs  no  less  ‘overwhelmingly’  in  favor  of  requiring  Mr.  Corwin  to  testify  than  in  Delaney.”). 
184. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948. 
185. The higher standard requires that the information be highly critical and necessary while 
the lower standard simply mandates that there is a reasonable possibility that the information will 
help the  defendant’s  case.    See id. at 948–49.  If evidence is so necessary as to be needed by the 
defendant, it is without question  that  the  material  is  necessary  because  it  will  help  the  defendant’s  
case.  See generally id.  For this reason, if the higher standard is satisfied, the information will 
automatically satisfy the lower standard as well.  See generally id. 
186. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c). 
187. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 951. 
188. Id. 
189. See, e.g., Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d  at 578 (explaining that the journalist 
took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine and later published an 
article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Magazine containing some information that was in-
consistent with what the police officers had reported.  The journalist was compelled to testify de-
spite   assertion   of   the   reporter’s   privilege.      The   journalist,   police,   and   defendant  were   the   only  
people involved, which limited the sources of evidence.). 
190. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-906; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-h(c) (no alternative source is available for the information sought).  
191. See Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descriptions:  Police Officer, supra 
note 159. 
192. Id.; see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 (mentioning that the reporter 
was present and took notes while the police arrested the defendant for trafficking in cocaine). 
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the   reporter’s   notes.193  Reporters have a duty to inform the public of the 
truth and their notes are often what reflect that truth.194  Unlike the police, 
they do not have a stake in the arrest or incident.195  Therefore, it is clear that 
a  reporter’s  eyewitness  account  is  highly  material,  necessary,  and  unique. 
C.  Other Privileges Have Also Been Subject to Similar Exceptions 
The federal government has not codified any privileges.196  However, 
states have acted independently and created numerous privileges among 
which are the attorney-client privilege,197 the physician-patient privilege,198 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege,199 and   the   reporter’s  privilege.200  In 
California, most privileges include a codified exception where harm to an-
other will follow if the privileged information is not divulged.201 
California Evidence Code section 956.5 permits an attorney to reveal 
confidential information violating the attorney-client confidentially privi-
lege,  “to  prevent  a  criminal  act  that  the  lawyer reasonably believes is likely 
to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.”202  
Further, in California, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which ordinari-
ly protects communications between a therapist and patient during treat-
ment,203 must  be  violated   if   the   therapist  “has  reasonable  cause   to  believe  
that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous 
 
193. See State v. Riley, 381 So. 2d 1359, 1360 (Fla. 1980) (questioning whether a police 
officer knowingly falsified police reports); see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 561 So. 2d at 578 
(explaining that the journalist was present and took notes while the police arrested the defendant 
for trafficking in cocaine and later published an article in the Miami Herald Sunday Tropic Mag-
azine containing some information that was inconsistent with what police officers had reported.  
The  journalist  was  compelled  to  testify  despite  assertion  of  the  reporter’s  privilege.).  
194. See Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
195. See id. (discussing that reporters have a duty to inform the public).  Police officers, on 
the other hand, have the duty to keep communities safe, and deciding whether to arrest a suspect 
is in furtherance of that duty.  See generally Sworn Police Officer Class Titles and Job Descrip-
tions:  Police Officer, supra note 159. 
196. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501. 
197. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950–62 (West 2011). 
198. See, e.g., id. §§ 990–1007 (West 2011). 
199. See, e.g., id. §§ 1010–28 (West 2011). 
200. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b). 
201. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (discussing the attorney-client privilege); id. 
§ 1024 (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. § 998 (discussing the physician-
patient privilege).  
202. Id. § 956.5.  
203. Id. §§ 1010, 1012. 
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to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the 
communication is necessary to  prevent  the  threatened  danger.”204 
The physician-patient privilege is also subject to exceptions.205  De-
spite the fact California has not codified a specific exception to the privi-
lege, California Evidence Code section 998 nonetheless applies and gener-
ally states  “there  is  no  privilege  in  this  article  in  a  criminal  proceeding.”206  
This means that if a physician were subpoenaed for a criminal case involv-
ing a patient, he or she would not be able to assert the physician-patient 
privilege and refuse to testify.207 
An  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege  requiring  media  who  partici-
pate in ride-alongs to testify in criminal cases would constitute a similar 
exception to those established in the attorney-client privilege, the physi-
cian-patient privilege, and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.208  The ex-
ception   is  needed  to  protect  a  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair   trial.209  In doing 
so, the reporter would ultimately be preventing substantial harm to anoth-
er—a false or unfair conviction of the defendant in question.210  For this 
reason, exceptions have been made to other privileges, and now the report-
er’s  privilege demands a similar exception. 
D.    A  Criminal  Defendant’s  Sixth  Amendment  Right  to  a  Fair  Trial  Trumps  
a  Reporter’s  First  Amendment  Right to Freedom of Press when that 
Reporter Participates in a Media Ride-Along 
The  reporter’s  privilege  stems  from  the  First  Amendment  of the Unit-
ed States Constitution.211  The right to a fair trial is inscribed in the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.212  The exception proposed 
 
204. Id. § 1024. 
205. CAL. EVID. CODE § 998 (falling under the physician-patient privilege section of the 
Code.). 
206. Id. 
207. People   v.   Ditson,   369   P.2d   714,   733   (Cal.   1962)   (“There is, of course, no doctor-
patient  privilege  in  criminal  cases.”). 
208. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (discussing the attorney-client privilege); id. 
§ 1024 (discussing the psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. § 998 (discussing the physician-
patient privilege).  
209. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
210. See Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway to Justice:  Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence, 
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1279,  1304  (2010)   (“The  Sixth  Amendment   right   to  counsel  protects   the  
innocent from wrongful conviction, incarceration, and execution.  The Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation encourages truth finding to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, incar-
ceration,  and  execution.”). 
211. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
212. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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in this Article benefits the criminal defendant and impinges upon the First 
Amendment right of the reporter.  Thus, this Comment urges that in this 
narrow area, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial should trump the 
First Amendment right to freedom of press. 
A  reporter’s  right  to  freedom  of  press,  embedded  in  the  First  Amend-
ment, does not overcome the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.213  A 
criminal  defendant’s  due  process  depends  on  receiving  a  fair  trial;;  without  
a fair trial, a criminal defendant is deprived of the right to due process.214  
A  fair  trial  is  the  defendant’s  only  chance  at  freedom  from  conviction  and  
the  subsequent  “social  stigma  of  being  labeled  as  [a]  criminal[]”  for  the  rest  
of his or her life.215  As   a   result,   “a   newsperson’s   protection under the 
shield  law  must  yield  to  a  criminal  defendant’s  constitutional  right  to  a  fair  
trial  when   the  newsperson’s   refusal   to  disclose   information  would  unduly  
infringe  on  that  right.”216  This  “constitutional  right  to  compulsory  process  
was intended to permit [the defendant] to request governmental assistance 
in obtaining likely helpful evidence, not just evidence that [the defendant] 
can show beforehand will go to the heart of his case.”217  Compulsory pro-
cess requires that the defendant be entitled to expose all relevant infor-
mation  to  ensure  the  defendant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial.218 
In United States v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished and clearly expressed 
[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive.  The ends of criminal jus-
tice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a 
partial or speculative presentation of the facts.  The very integri-
ty of the judicial system and public confidence in the system de-
pend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of 
the rules of evidence.219 
Professor Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School stated 
[t]he media plays an important role as a watchdog.  When they are 
at the scene, then the information that they have might be im-
 
213. Id. at amends. I, VI.  See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.  
214. See Rock, 483 U.S. 51–52 
215. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
216. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937. 
217. Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 
218. People v. Hendrix, 820 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417 (App. Div. 2006); see also Nixon, 418 
U.S.  at  709  (“To  ensure  that  justice  is  done, it is imperative to the function of courts that com-
pulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or 
by  the  defense.”).   
219. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709. 
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portant enough to outweigh their general privilege not to testify.  
In the end, no matter how important we think the First Amend-
ment is, it is not more important than the right to a fair trial.220 
In furthering this opinion, M. Gerald Schwartzbach, counsel for Rob-
ert Blake during his murder trial in 2005, commented, 
[t]hough freedom of the press is essential to any democracy, a re-
porter who voluntarily elects to become a witness to a criminal 
investigation should not be permitted to remain silent when he or 
she possesses relevant information.  To conclude otherwise would 
be to allow him or her to remain silent in the face of police error 
or misconduct and thus deny an accused the right to a fair trial.221 
Although there is arguably a need for balance between the First and 
Sixth Amendments, a First Amendment claim is not substantial enough to jus-
tify superiority over the Sixth Amendment.222  For this reason, the Sixth 
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  a  fair  trial,  with  access  to  all  evidence  pursuant  to  
compulsory process, trumps the First Amendment right to freedom of press.223 
E.  Public Policy Favors the Exception 
This Article prescribes an absolute and codified exception to the report-
er’s  privilege.    Imposing  the  exception  can  be  made  feasible  by  requiring  po-
lice departments to include a waiver clause in their ride-along agreements for 
media members.224  However,  because  the  reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  pro-
mote the freedom of press and an informed public,225 there is a concern that 
the proposed exception might have a chilling effect on reporters.226 
 
220. Interview with Laurie Levenson, Professor at Law, Loyola Law School, in Los Ange-
les, California (Nov. 21, 2011). 
221. E-mail from M. Gerald Schwartzbach, Attorney for Robert Blake, Law Offices of M. 
Gerald Schwartzbach, P.C., to author (Nov. 21, 2011, 5:46 PM) (on file with author).  
222. George Blum et al., Protection in Criminal Proceedings, 31A CAL. JUR. 3D 599 
(2012); see Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654–55. 
223. Interview with Levenson, supra note   220   (“The  media   plays   an   important   role   as   a  
watchdog.  When they are at the scene, then the information that they have might be important 
enough to outweigh their general privilege not to testify.  In the end, no matter how important we 
think  the  First  Amendment  is,  it  is  not  more  important  than  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.”). 
224. Guccione, supra note 9.  The court believed that Corwin had waived his shield law 
privilege.  Id.  If police departments always include a waiver stating that the media member 
waives his or her reporter’s  privilege,  the  reporter  becomes  an  “agent”  of  the  police  department,  
and  “that  [his  or  her]  work  product  may  be  subject to subpoena and production in either criminal 
and/or  civil  litigation,”  the  exception will be imposed with little effort.  Id. 
225. Wright, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
226. See In re Slack,  768  F.  Supp.  2d  at  193  (“Courts  have  minimized  impositions upon the 
press, particularly when burdens may have a chilling effect on a reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  
and  gather  news.”). 
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Nonetheless,  this  exception  to  the  reporter’s  privilege  would  not  have  a  
chilling effect because it would not violate any privileges of the reporters.  
Forcing  the  reporter  to  testify  “involves  no  restraint  on  what  newspapers  may  
publish or on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to ac-
quire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between 
reporters  and  their  sources.”227  In  fact,  “[t]he  reporters  are  not  being asked to 
breach a confidence or to disclose sensitive information that would in any 
way even remotely restrict their news-gathering ability.  All that is being re-
quired of them is that they accept the civic responsibility imposed on all per-
sons  who  witness  alleged  criminal  conduct.”228  Thus, the proposed excep-
tion  to  the  reporter’s  privilege,  effectuated  through  a  waiver,  will  serve  as  the  
consideration for the right to participate in a media ride-along. 
This exception is not proposed to hinder the free flow of information or 
to halt reporters’   investigations.229  On the contrary, requiring the reporters 
on these ride-alongs to testify only promotes the free flow of information; 
specifically, this exception will lead to the reporting of truthful and accurate 
accounts of investigations and arrests by an objective and neutral party.230 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The  influx  of  cases  challenging  the  reporter’s  privilege  illustrates  the  
need to clarify its scope.231  Undoubtedly, the new phenomenon of media 
ride-alongs has left reporters with a benefit—an opportunity to be an eye-
witness.232  Additionally, reporters are given a privilege that exempts them 
from having to testify at criminal trials.233  Recent cases have shown that 
this   reporter’s  privilege  occasionally  conflicts  with  a  criminal  defendant’s  
right to a fair trial.234  Judges grant motions made by criminal defendants 
 
227. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.  
228. Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953.  
229. Wright,  381  F.  Supp.  2d  at  1116  (stating  that  the  purpose  of  the  reporter’s  privilege  is  
to  “ensur[e]  the  free  flow  of  information”).     
230. See generally Delaney, 789 P.2d at 953 (noting that the reporter was with the police 
when the police allegedly touched the defendant without his consent, making the reporter one of 
the few people who knew exactly what happened).  
231. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
232. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. 1990) (noting that the 
reporter was present during the arrest therefore had direct knowledge of whether or not the de-
fendant  consented  to  the  police  touching  his  jacket);;  Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Morejon,  561  
So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 1990) (discussing the presence of the reporter when the police encountered 
the defendant at the airport and arrested him for trafficking in cocaine). 
233. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (1991); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW §79-h (McKinney 1990). 
234. See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1999); Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; 
People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643 (2005). 
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and  order  reporters  to  testify  to  eyewitness  accounts  despite  the  reporter’s  
assertion of this privilege.235  In light of the privilege received by reporters, 
the Latin saying of quid pro quo should be remembered.236 
By allowing reporters and journalists to act as constructive police of-
ficers, thereby entitling them to some of the privileges that officers main-
tain, such as being present during an arrest when initial actions are taken 
and decisions made, it is only fair that reporters give up a privilege of their 
own,  namely,  the  reporter’s  privilege.237  This Article does not suggest ter-
minating  the  reporter’s  privilege  in  its  entirety,  nor  does  it  propose  a  viola-
tion of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.238  For the 
sole purpose of providing a fair trial for criminal defendants, this Article 
recommends a narrow exception to the well established privilege for those 
reporters who participate in media ride-alongs—an exception that does not 
intrude  upon  the  underlying  purpose  of  the  reporter’s  privilege.239  Not only 
would such an exception satisfy the three-pronged test adopted by most ju-
risdictions for violating the privilege, but such an exception to the report-
er’s  privilege  would  also  be  consistent with the trend of courts to compel 
reporters who participated in a ride-along to testify.240 
 
 
235. See, e.g., Guccione, supra note 9; Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 
561 So. 2d 577; United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
236. Quid pro quo, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/quid% 
2Bpro%2Bquo?region=us&q=quid+pro+quo (last visited Dec. 10,  2012)   (“a   favor  or  advantage  
granted or expected in  return  for  something”). 
237. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 (stating 
that reporter Miles Corwin participated in witness interviews); see also Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 
561 So. 2d at 578 (noting that the reporter was present and took notes while the police arrested 
the defendant for trafficking in cocaine); Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (discussing that the reporter on 
a media ride-along was present when police searched the defendant and found him in possession 
of brass knuckles). 
238. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
239. The  reporter’s  privilege  seeks  to  maintain  the  flow  of  information  by  ensuring  that  con-
fidences will not be revealed, but the defendant being subject to a search warrant has no reasona-
ble expectation of confidentially pertaining to the reporter at that time.  Wright v. F.B.I., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating the reporter’s  privilege  exists  to  promote  the  “free  
flow of information”)  (internal  citation  omitted);;  see also In re Slack, 768 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 
(D.D.C.  2011)   (“Courts  have  minimized   impositions  upon   the  press,  particularly  when  burdens  
may have a chilling effect  on  a  reporter’s  ability  to  investigate  and  gather  news.”).    However,  re-
porters who participate in media ride-alongs are not present for the purpose of a scheduled meet-
ing or photo shoot.  See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 937 (emphasizing that the reporters were ac-
companying the police with police permission).  The reporter is present as a mere observer, not a 
confidant.  See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence, supra note 13, at 8 
(stating that reporter Miles Corwin was present to observe the investigation). 
240. See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d 934; Guccione, supra note 9; Miami  Herald  Publ’g  Co., 
561 So. 2d 577; Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149. 
